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OPINING ON DEATH: WITNESS SENTENCE
RECOMMENDATIONS IN CAPITAL TRIALS
WAYNE A. LOGAN *

Abstract: Despite the Supreme CoUrt's command that capital prosecutions
be free of undue arbitrary and capricious influences, the trials themselves
are becoming increasingly emotional and personalized. This Article addresses a key outgrowth of this evolution: the increasingly common practice
of witnesses opining on whether a defendant should be put to death, despite
the Court's apparent prohibition of such testimony. The Article addresses
why this practice is likely to continue, and advances several reasons why the
Supreme Court should impose an unequivocal bar on sentence opinion, testimony in capital trials.
Fish not, with this melancholy bait,
For this fool gudgeon, this opinion.
—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE

act 1, sc. 1.

INTRODUCTION

Spurred by the politically potent victims' rights movement, the
U.S. criminal justice system has embarked upon a sustained and comprehensive effort to lessen the alienation felt by the victims of crime.
One clear upshot of this evolution is that criminal prosecutions have
become more personalized and "compensation" oriented and less
consciously oriented toward vindicating society's traditional retributive and deterrent goals)
Given this evolution, and the profound personal consequences of
murder, it should come as no surprise that death penalty prosecutions
have also become more personalized in recent times. 2 As one comAssistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York, Albany.
B.A., Wesleyan University; M.A., State University of New York, Albany; J.D. University of
Wisconsin. I ant indebted to Professors James Acker, David Logan, Scott Stindby and Ron
Wright for their comments in the preparation of this Article.
I See GEORGE P. RETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 200-01 (1995).
2 The Wyoming capital prosecution of Aaron McKinney for the murder of Matthew
Shepard provided an instructive recent example of this personalization. After convicting
McKinney for his part in the gruesome murder, the jury was preparing to hear evidence on
whether he should be put to death. That morning, however, the grieving parents of Mr.
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mentator has suggested: "Mil the past, capital sentencing pitted the
defendant against the State .... In the new paradigmatic sentencing
hearing, the capital defendant now encounters an even more formidable opponent: the person whose death made her eligible for the
death penalty, the capital. victim."3 Although this shift stems from several key developments, the proliferation of "victim impact evidence"
in capital trials, as permitted by the United States Supreme Court's
1991 decision in Payne v. Tennessee,4 surely figures among the most
prominent. As a result of Payne's lifting of the per se constitutional bar
against victim impact evidence, the survivors of murder victims now
regularly provide highly emotional, gripping testimony of the manifold losses suffered as a result of defendants' murderous acts. 5
This Article examines a distinct, yet closely related form of witness input at sentencing, namely, witnesses' opinions on whether the
convicted capital defendant should be put to . death. The Article first
surveys the Supreme Court's case law regarding the permissibility of
sentence opinion testimony in capital trials, which ostensibly prohibits
its admission. As will be evident, howeVer, the prohibition is frequently
being honored in the breach, with courts across the land now either
expressing uncertainty over the continued existence of the prohibition or upholding admission of sentence opinion testimony on a variety of rationales. This hemorrhage, it will be argued, is likely to only
accelerate in capital trials to come, especially given the obvious appeal
of providing victims a "voice" in determining the fate of their assailants. Mindful of this eventuality, the Article explores why sentence
opinion testimony should be prohibited in capital trials and urges
that the Court adopt a bright-line rule expressly prohibiting its use.
I. THE ROLE OF WITNESSES' OPINIONS IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING DECISIONS
One would presume that the sentiments of crime victims, the individuals who suffer the actual physical harm of the crime perpe-

Shepard intervened to derail the capital penalty phase and, against the wishes of the local
district attorney, "granted" McKinney life. SeeTom Kenworthy, "Jut Going to Grant Thu Life,"

Parents of Slain Gay Student Agree to Prison for his Killer, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A2.
3 Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart ;Viten the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF.
L. REV. 85, 86 (1993).
' Scr 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
5 See generally Wayne A. Logan,

Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of
Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Dials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1999) (examining content,

form and widespread use of victim impact evidence).
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trated, would play a paramount role in sentencing decisions. Reality,
in fact, is consistent with this presumption, as jurisdictions very often
allow victims to opine on the quantum of punishment their assailants
should receive. 6 This orientation is also reflected in the American Bar
Association's Uniform Victims of Crime Ad, which directs that the court
"shall" permit victims to provide their "opinion regarding the appropriate

sentence."7
In the capital sentencing realm, however, the courts have been
considerably less willing to permit the sentencing authority to consider sentence opinion testimony from victims (or, more commonly,
their survivors). This section focuses on this reluctance, paying particular attention to the U.S. Supreme Court's statements in recent
years on the permissibility of sentence opinion testimony in capital
proceedings.
A. The Outlines of a Per Se Rule of Exclusion: Booth, Gathers, Huertas
and Payne
The Court's jurisprudence on sentence opinion testimony derives from several decisions concerning what has come to be known as
"victim impact evidence."8 Booth v. Maryland, decided in 1987, marked
the justices' initial foray into the area. 9 Booth involved the brutal robbery-murders of two elderly victims, the Bronsteins, killed by their
neighbor and his accomplice who were in search of money or property to buy heroin.") After finding Booth guilty of both murders, the
jury was read a "victim impact statement" prepared by the State Division of Probation and Parole as part of its felony presentence report."

°

See generally Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal fitstice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Cry.
CONfiNEMENT 21, 69-90 (1998) (surveying proliferation of victims' rights provisions ensuring ''right to be heard" at sentencing); see also generally Banda v. State, 846 P.2d 278, 27980 (Nev. 1993) (allowing survivor to provide sentence recommendation in non-capital murder prosecution). In one particularly high-profile instance, a Minnesota judge permitted a
sexual assault victim to determine the sentence imposed on her convicted assailant. See.
Bruce J. Schulte, Victim Sentences
75 A.B.A. J. 28 (Apr. 1989).
7

Hex Attacker: Judge Lets 65-Year-01d Pick Rapist's Punishment,

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, UNIFORM VICHMS OF CRIME ACT § 216 (1993) (em-

phasis added).
Ming varieties and content of victim
8 See grnerally Logan, supra note 5, at 150-69 (examining
impact evidence).
9 See 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
10

See id. at 498.
Under Maryland law, the contents of the report could be read to the jury or the surSee id. at 499, 501. At the request of Booth's lawyer, who

vivors could provide live testimony.
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The report was based on interviews with the decedents' son, daughter,
son-in-law, and granddaughter, and contained two basic kinds of information.
First, the report conveyed at length the survivors' descriptions of
the positive personal characteristics of the elderly victims and the
emotional impact of the murders on the family as a whole. 12 Writing
for the majority, Justice Powell condemned the evidence as "irrelevant" and rejected the State of Maryland's assertion that such information permitted jurors to assess the "gravity" of the offense." According to Justice Powell, the evidence in effect refocused the
sentencing decision from the defendant and his criminal act to "the
character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family,"
despite the fact that the defendant was wholly unaware of the personal qualities and worth of the victim. 14 In so doing, Justice Powell
concluded, the State created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk that
the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious
manner" in violation of the Eighth Amendment."
Second, the report contained two related forms of testimony: (1)
family members' characterizations of the crime (characterization testimony) and (2) their opinions as to the sentence the defendant
should receive (sentence Opinion testimony)." As to the characterization testimony, the Bronsteins' son told the jury that his parents had
been "butchered like animals." The daughter added that "animals
wouldn't do this."17 The sentence opinion testimony offered, however,
was considerably more subtle. The son simply opined that he did not
"think anyone should be able to do something like [the murders] and
get away with it."18 For her part, the daughter related that she did not
"feel that the people who [committed the murders] could ever be rehabilitated and [that] she [did not] want them to be able to do this
again or put another family through this." 19 In short, the family
wanted "swift and just punishment."20
feared that the "use of live testimony would increase the inflammatory effect of the information," the prosecution read the statement to the jury. Id. at 501.
12 See id. at 499-500.
13 Id. at 509.
/ 4 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
15 Id. at 503.
IG See id.
17 Id. at 508.

Id.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
20 Id.
18
19
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Justice Powell was sympathetic to the survivors yet clear in his
condemnation of both forms of testimony:
One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused
by the brutal murders in this case, and there is no doubt that
jurors are generally aware of these feelings. But the formal
presentation of this information by the State can serve no
other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from
deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the
crime and the defendant . . . . The admission of these emotionally-charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury
should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with
the reasoned decision making we require in capital cases. 21
The Booth Court thus erected a per se Eighth Amendment bar
against victim impact evidence in capital trials. The Court, however,
was at pains to state that its prohibition did not extend to non-capital
trials, on the reasoning that "death is a 'punishment different from all
other sanctions,' and that therefore the considerations that inform
the sentencing decision may be different from those that might be
relevant to other liability or punishment determinations." 22 The dissents, although disagreeing with the majority's preclusion of victim
impact evidence more generally, seemingly agreed that sentence opinion testimony was impermissible. 23

21 Id.
22 Id. at 509 11.12 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)).
Writing in dissent, Justice White questioned why victim impact evidence should be precluded in capital trials Inn allowed in non-capital trials. According toinstice White:

If punishment can be enhanced in noncapital cases on the basis of the harm
caused, irrespective of the offender's specific intention to cause such harm, I
fail to see why the same approach is unconstitutional in death cases. If anything I would dank that victim impact statements are particularly appropriate
in capital sentencing hearings: the State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in ....

Id. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting).
23 Both Justices White and Scalia filed dissents, each joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice O'Connor, as well as each other. Justice White expressed his position on the question of sentence opinion testimony in somewhat ambiguous terms, stating:

To the extent that the Court determines that in this case it was inappropriate
to allow the victims' family to express their opinions on, for example, whether
petitioner could be rehabilnated, that is obviously not an inherent fault in all
victim impact statements and no reason to declare the practice of admitting
such statements at capital sentencing hearings per se unconstitutional.

522
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Only two years later, in 1989, in South Carolina v. Gathers,24 the
Court was faced with yet another Eighth Amendment claim against
the use of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital
trial. This time the Court addressed the propriety of an emotional
closing argument by the prosecution that praised at length the religiosity and civic-mindedness of the decedent, a self-styled "Reverend
Minister."25 The prosecutor told the jury that "[n]o one takes any
pleasure from it but the proof cries out from the grave in this case." 26
Despite the not-so-veiled death recommendation conveyed by the
prosecutor, the Gathers majority inferred that the prosecutor's remarks related only to the victim's "personal characteristics." 27 Although not testimony from survivors, the Court considered the statements "indistinguishable" from those statements condemned in Booth
and hence impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. 28
The following term,: the Court agreed to hear Ohio v. Huertas,
providing the justices with an opportunity to revisit the Booth prohibition of sentence opinion testimony under facts that were even more
clear-cut than those in Booth. 29 In a 1986 trial conducted before Booth
and Gathers were decided, Huertas was convicted of the stabbing
death of a male friend as a result of a romantic triangle." At sentencing, the State proffered each type of impact evidence condemned in
Booth. 31 As to the sentence opinion testimony, the victim's father was
directly asked by the prosecutor whether he thought Huertas should
receive the death penalty. Over defense objection, the father replied,
"He took a life. Yes, I do." 2 A presentence report, also admitted into
evidence, reiterated the father's view that Huertas should be semi-

Booth, 482 U.S. at 518-19 (White, J., dissenting) Justice Scalia altogether failed to address
sentence opinion testimony, instead condemning the five-member majority for its per se
exclusion of victim impact evidence in capital trials. See id. at 519-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 490 U.S. 805 {1989).
25 Id. at 808-10.
26 Id. at 809.
27 Id. at 811; see also id. at 813 15 (O'Connor, j., dissenting) (stating that she "would reject a rigid 'Eighth Amendment rule winds prohibits a sentencing jury from hearing argument or considering evidence concerning the personal characteristics of the victim. [She]
would thus reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case.").
" Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
29 SeeState v. nuertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 807 (1991).
341 See id. at 1062.
31 See id.
52 See Joint Appendix at 145, Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 396 (1991) (No. 89-1944).
-
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tenced to death." The Ohio jury complied with the father's wish and
sentenced Huertas to death. 34
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held in 1990 that Booth and
Gathers retroactively controlled, requiring reversal of the death sentence. The court, however, based its reversal solely on the ground that
sentence opinion testimony was put before the jury, yet did so in a
curious fashion." According to the court:

The type of evidence given by the victim's family in this case goes beyond that considered in Booth and Gathers. Here, a family member offered his opinion on what the appropriate sentence would be for
• the defendant. A distinction should be drawn, in considering
victim impact evidence, between (1) evidence relating to the
victim's character, (2) evidence relating to the circumstances
of the crime, and (3) evidence consisting of the opinions of
the victim's family as to an appropriate punishment for the
defendant."
The Huertas majority thus appeared to infer that sentence opinion
testimony was not addressed by Booth, a view underscored by its ensuing discussion of the focus in the Gathers and Booth dissents on evidence relating to the "suffering caused by a particular crime." 57 Writing on what it implied was a clean constitutional slate, the Ohio court
concluded that the sentence opinion testimony warranted reversal.
According to the, court, "le]xpressions of opinion by a witness as to
the appropriateness of a particular sentence in a capital case violate
the defendant's constitutional right to have the sentencing decision
made by the jury and judge.""
On appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Ohio
framed the issue largely as whether the Ohio Supreme Court "misinterpreted" Booth and Gathers, insofar as neither precluded victim impact evidence when the assailant knew the victim and his family, a circumstance arguably making the impact more foreseeable and

See IThertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1062.
M Sri id. at 1060.
53

See id. at 1005.
Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 1064, 1070 (Moyer, CJ., concurring) (observing "the fact that the majority and
two dissenters in this case all interpret the opinions mid footnotes in Booth and Gathers
55
36

differently demonstrates the uncertainty of die law in this area").
" Hurrtas, 553 N.E.2d at 1060.

Boston College Law Review
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defendant's personal culpability that much greater. 39 Huertas, on the
other hand, framed the issue as whether the father's sentence opinion
testimony was propel; a question answered in the negative by the
Ohio Supreme Court. Moreover, in what turned out to be an extremely shrewd tactical move, Huertas argued that the sentence opinion testimony did not pose a constitutional problem; rather, the testimony warranted preclusion on the basis of Ohio evidentiary law,
which bars lay witness "opinion testimony" on "ultimate issues." 40 Accordingly, Huertas urged that the writ for certiorari be dismissed as
improvidently granted for want of federal question jurisdiction,
thereby avoiding an otherwise "purely advisory opinion."'"
The Huertas oral argument was marked by similar uncertainty.
The justices hammered away at the position adopted by the State of
Ohio, repeatedly noting that the syllabus of the Ohio Supreme
Court's opinion, which under State law encapsulates the actual holding,42 addressed only the impropriety of the sentence opinion testimony and not the other types of victim impact evidence also admitted
at tria1.43 In the end, the justices appeared to agree with Huertas that
the case posed a mere evidentiary issue based on independent and
adequate state law grounds,44 as they dismissed the grant of certiorari
as improvidently granted: less than one week after oral arguments."5
So, for reasons that ultimately remain unknown, 46 the Court elected
to avoid directly addressing the Ohio Supreme Court's pregnant
statement that the sentence opinion testimony in Huertas went "beyond that considered in Booth and Gathers."47
39

See Petitioner's Brief, Ohio v. litierias, 498 U.S. 396 (1991), available at 1990 WL

505758.
4° See Respondent's Brief, Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 386 (1991), available at 1990 WL
505759, at *12-16.

Id.
See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257, 259 (1976) (acknowledging same).
43 See Oral Argument Transcript, Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 386, available at 1991 WL
41

42

636295 thereinafter 'Transcript'''.
44 See, e.g., id. at *13 (one unidentified justice stating "[w]ell, I don't see why [reversal]
wouldn't have occurred if Booth and Gathers were somehow off the books.").
is See Ohio v. fluertas, 498 U.S. 336 (Jan. 22, 1991),
46 If the Court dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, this rationale is undercut by the reality that the Ohio Supreme Court failed to cite a single Ohio precedent in
support of any purported independent and adequate state ground. See Huertas, 553 N.E.2d
at 1065. Indeed, counsel for Huertas herself was obliged to characterize the omission of
controlling Ohio precedent as "very strange" and "unique." See Transcript, supra note 43,
at *36. Moreover, the law of the case as reflected in the syllabus refers to the violation of a
"constitutional right"—not a mere evidentiary rule. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1060.
47 See Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1064.
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Filially, almost one month after the Court's dismissal of Huer1as
came promise of a definitive answer on the permissibility of sentence
opinion testimony. With a newly constituted and clear conservative
majority, the Court agreed to hear Payne v. Tennessee, a capital case involving acknOwledged victim impact evidence, tried in the wake of
Booth.48 Payne was convicted of the brutal stabbing deaths of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, as well as the near-fatal
stabbing of her three-year-old son Nicholas. During the sentencing
phase, the State presented the testimony of Ms. Christopher's mother,
who testified how her grandson Nicholas had been affected by the
murders of his mother and sister:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why
she doesn't conic home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He
comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
Grandma, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell hint yes. He says,
I'm worried about my Lade. 49
Further, during closing argument the prosecutor argued to the jury as
follows:
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the
families involved in this case.... But there is something you
can do for Nicholas. Somewhere down the road Nicholas is
going to grow up, hopefully. He's going to want to know
what happened. And he is going to know what happened to
his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know
what kind of justice was done. He is going to want to know
what happened. With your verdict you will provide the answe r. 5°
The jury sentenced Payne to death on both murder counts and
the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, deeming the admission of
the victim impact evidence harmless error. 51 On appeal to the Supreme Court, a new six-member majority engineered a dramatic
about-face. 52 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist first disSee Payne V. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Id. at 814-15.
50 Id. at 815.
n See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10,19 (Tenn. 1990).
52 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The Court's determination to rethink
Booth and Cattle* was evident at the outset when. in its grant of certiorari, the Court requested expedited consideration of the appeal. and, even more significantly. expressly
48
49
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puted the premise of Booth and Gathers that "evidence relating to a
particular victim or to the harm that a capital defendant causes a victim's family" is immaterial to capital decision making." Rather, the
Chief Justice reasoned, harm traditionally has served as a factor in
assessing blameworthiness in punishment decisions; although "this
particular evidence—designed to portray for the sentencing authority
the actual harm caused by a particular crime—is of recent origin, this
hardly renders it unconstitutional."54 The second, more practical reason for admitting victim impact evidence was to "'keep the balance
true'" in capital trials. 55 Because Lockett v. Ohio56 and Woodson v. North
Carolina57 mandate unfettered consideration of relevant mitigating
evidence, proffered in the name of showing the "uniqueness" and
personal culpability of the defendant, fairness required that evidence
relating to the "uniqueness" of the life taken by the defendant also be
considered by the sentei icing authority. 55
In abandoning its per se Eighth Amendment prohibition of impact evidence, the Payne majority related in a footnote that it was only
reversing the holdings in Booth and Gathers "relating to the victim and
the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family." 59 The majority
added that it did not feel constrained to reexamine Booth's prohibition of sentence opinion (and characterization) testimony, because
"(n)o evidence" of this sort was presented in Payne's trial. 60

directed the parties to address whether Booth and Gathers should be reversed, a question
not embodied in the certiorari petition. See Payne v. Thimessee, 498 U.S. 1080 (Feb. 19.
1991) (order granting certiorari). Surely sensing the ultimate jurisprudential outcome,
Justice Stevens dissented (along with Justices Marshall and Blackmun), calling the grant of
certiorari on these terms "unwise and unnecessary." See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens added: "[T] he Court's decision to review the alleged Booth error in this case would
be inappropriate in any event because the decision below rested alternatively on the
ground that any Booth violation that might have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
53 Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
55

Id.
See id. at 827 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).

56

438 U.S. 586 (1978).

51

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
58 Pay ne, 501 U.S. at 826 ("There is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in
57

mind that harm at the same time as it is considers the mitigating evidence introduced by
the defendatit.").
" Id. at 830 n.2.
60 See id. at 830 (O'Connorj„ concurring) (stating the Court's holding did not reach
Booth's purported limit on sentence opinion testimony); see also id. at 835 ti.1 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating the same).
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The majority's view that "no evidence" was put before the Payne
sentencing jury, however, was plainly belied by the record. As excerpted above, the Tennessee prosecutor importuned the jury that
"[Nicholas] is ... going to want to know what type of justice was
done. . . . With your verdict, you will provide the answer. " 61 Coming in
the wake of extensive and highly emotional impact evidence of the
gruesome double-murder and its profound toll on Nicholas and his
family, this plea was obviously intended to induce the jury to fulfill the
anticipated wishes of three-year-old Nicholas. Even more important,
the prosecutor suggested that Nicholas would be disappointed if the
jury concluded otherwise, yet that there was "something" the jury
could "do for Nicholas." 62
Viewed objectively, the prosecutor's surrogate request for Nicholas was at least as conspicuous as the sentencing request made by the
survivors in Booth. In Booth; a majority of the Court condemned the
mere pessimistic surmise by the Bronsteins' daughter that she did not
"feel that the people who [committed the murders] could ever be
rehabilitated and [that] she doesn't want them to be able to do this
again or put another family through this.'" 63 Similarly objectionable
was the restrained statement by the Bronsteins' son that he "doesn't
think anyone should be able to do something like [the murders] and
get away with it."64 The Payne majority's conclusion that opinion testimony was absent was made all the more inexplicable in light of the
appellate record. Counsel for Payne extensively briefed the issue of
sentence opinion testimony adduced below. 65 Even more remarkably,
a large part of the oral argument was dedicated to a debate over the
propriety of allowing witnesses--both for the State and the defense—
to opine on the sentencing question. 66

Payne, 501 U.S. al 815.
See id.
63 See id.
M See id.
65 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner, at 29, in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE

61

62

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED SMUTS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1990 TERM SUPPLEMENT
578 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1992) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND

(arguing — Payne's sentence Must he set aside even if the Court leaves intact
only that part of Boot& that condemns the use of opinions and characterizations.").
66i Oral Argument, in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 65, at 807-37.
Still more curious was the failure of the otherwise comprehensive, and highly critical, dissents by Justices Stevens and Marshall to seize upon the presence of sentence opinion testimony, the admission of which would have warranted reversal or at least harmless error
analysis pursuant to Booth. Sm Payne, 501 U.S. at 844-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (omitting

ARGUMENTS]
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In the end, the Payne majority's conclusory statement that the
record contained "no evidence" of opinion testimony is regrettable
for at least two reasons, 67 First, the Court missed an opportunity to
clarify its position on sentence opinion testimony, an obvious need in
the wake of the cryptic result in Huertas. Second, even presuming the
continued existence of the prohibition, the Court failed to elucidate
the parameters of "opinion." As discussed next, the Court's omission
has not been without consequence.
B. The Consequences of Uncertainty
Whatever explains the failure of the Payne Court to acknowledge
and squarely address the issue of sentence opinion testimony, it is
readily apparent that marked uncertainty now persists over the extent,
and indeed the continued existence, of the prohibition ostensibly established in Booth.62 This situation is most pronounced in Oklahoma,
any discussion of admitted opinion testimony); see also id. at 856.-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
67 That the sentence opinion in Payne was admitted on the basis of the prosecutor's
closing statement, and thus as a technical matter did not emanate from witnesses as in
Booth, should have been of no moment. As Professor Vivian Berger n oted in the immediate
wake of Payne, Gathers "made such a distinction irrelevant." Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering—A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 42 11.109
(1992).
Empirical work, although scant, confirms the suspected prejudicial influence of
improper prosecutorial argument. One recent study, for instance, found on the basis of
controlled mock capital trials that "iplarticipant-jurors who were exposed to improper
statements made by the prosecution were significantly more likely to reconunend the
death penalty than jurors not exposed." Seejudy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the
Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Arguments in Capital Trials, 23
LAW & BEHAV. 471, 483 (1999).
68 See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 459 (Cal. 1995) (stating Payne "did not address the admissibility" of sentence opinion testimony); State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1088
(Idaho 1991) (stating "Weft unresolved by Payne ... is the issue of the family's feelings
and comments concerning the sentence to be imposed"); State v. Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d
1251, 1262 (Ohio 1999) (stating "Payne reserved judgment about opinions from the victim's family as to the sentence a capital defendant should receive"). Commentators over
the past several years have expressed similar uncertainty. See Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices
in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 A.M. GRIM. L. REV. 233, 253 n.122 (1991) (asserting "neither Booth nor Gathers specifically addressed a situation in which the victim (or the
victim's survivors) articulated a sentence recommendation"); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the
Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CoRNELL L. REV. 989, 1018 11.109
(1996) (stating sentence opinion testimony "is probably inadmissible" in the wake of
Payne); Robert. P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
443, 469 (stating Payne "did not resolve whether a victim's family members could express
their opinion regarding the proper punishment"); Kathryn E. Bartolo, Comment, The

Future Role of Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 77 IowA L. REV.
1217, 1239 (1992) (arguing Payne "sent an ambiguous message that a victim statement of
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where the judiciary has concluded that Payne "implicitly" overruled
Booth altogether, 69 and statutory law expressly permits sentence opinion testimony in capital trials." Accordingly; in Oklahoma, opinion
testimony is allowed as long as the opinion is "given as a straightforward, concise response to a question asking what the reconimendadon is; or a short statement of recommendation in a written statement, without amplification." 71
Sentence opinion testimony is also very often allowed on the basis of harmless error review, which itself fuels further 'prosecutorial
use of the testimony." The case law contains numerous instances of
blithe appellate approval of explicit sentence opinions that make the
Muted opinions condemned in Booth pale in comparison." This is esopinion introduced by a prosecutor may -be admissible"); Michael 1. Ober Lander, Comment, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1621, 1656-57 (1992) (stating 'the Payne Court provided state cou n ts with the opportunity to allow the introduction into evidence of the victim's family members' opinions
of the sentence that the sentencing agent should impose").
See Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920 (Okla. Grim. App. 1997); see also Ledbetter v.
State, 933 P.2d 880, 890-91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
70 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984(1) (West 2000) (permitting victim impact statement to contain, inter alia, "tlte victim's [or survivor's] opinion of a recommended sentence.").
71 See Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891.
72 See ROGER]. TRMNOR, TUE RtimLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 23 (1970) ("In the long
rim there would be a closer guard against error at the trial, if appellate courts were alert to
reverse, in case of doubt, for error that could have contaminated the judgment."); Harry
T. Edwards, 7b Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Ermr be Talerated, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1194 (1996) ("IWJe can hardly expect prosecutors to respect the
rights of criminal defendants ... when we as judges are unwilling to do so.").
75 See, eg, State v. Paz, 798 P.2d 1, 14-15 (Idaho 1990) (finding harmless error when
Father of victim "recommends that the court give the death penalty" to defendant); Smith
v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1277 (Ind. 1997) (finding harmless error when victim's sister
requested that defendant get "what he deserves" and thereby prevent "others from undergoing anguish"); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1336 (La. 1995) (finding harmless error
when prosecutor related that victim's family "requests" death penalty); Smith v. State, 932
P.2d 521, 537 n.13 (Okla. 1996) (finding harmless error when decedent's father beseeched
jury "What it [sic] going to take? More people got to be victims of these crimes that are
being committed?"); State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 558 (Tenn, 1999) (finding
harmless error when prosecutor importuned jury that the victim's "family asks that you
impose the death penalty. The State asks you to impose the death penalty .... justice demands it on the facts and the law.").
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has characterized the following statement from the mother of a 9-year-old victim as "over amplified," but harmless:
1 don't feel any remorse towards the defendant. 1 feel we should carry on with
the death sentence. The death sentence without benefit of tltc,jitd ge and jury
was what he gave freely to my child. I do not see that he can take from her
and be entitled to keep his own.
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pecially so when sentencing is carried out by the trial judge, 74 despite
the widespread recognition that, like jurors, judges can succumb to
the pathos and undue prejudice bred by inflammatory testimony. 75 As
one Arizona appellate judge stated in response to his colleagues'
confident rejection of a challenge based on sentence opinion testimony:
We have presumed that trial judges will ignore such testimony, but one must wonder how accurate such an assumption may be. The sentencing decision in capital cases is
difficult enough without subjecting the trial judge to the
emotional pressure of listening to the victims' understandable but legally inadmissible recommendations, often motivated by the need for catharsis and sometimes by the desire
for revenge. 76
Despite this reality, appellate courts now often resort to a highly suspect form of heuristic analysis, rejecting claims of prejudice merely
State v. Salazar, 973 P.2d 315, 325 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998), '.cent denied, 120 S.Ct. 226
(1999).
74 See, e.g., State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 792 (Ariz. 1997); Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038,
1091 (Fla. 1991); State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Idaho 1991); People v. Harris, 695
N.E.2d 447, 467 (III. 1998); State v. Hough, 690 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. 1997); State v.
Gideon, 894 P.2d 850, 864 (Kan. 1995); Johnson v. State, 703 A.2(1 1267, 1277 (Md. 1998);
State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 938 (Mo. 1997) (en bane); State v. Bjorklund, 604 N.I.V.2d
169, 214-15 (Neb. 2000); State v..Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio 1995); Beck v.
Commonwealth, 484 S,E.2d 898, 906 (Va. 1997).
75 Indeed, even putting aside the obvious empathic pull of such testimony, concern
should exist over the fact that it is provided in the politically charged context of the death
penalty. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 523 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Not
surprisingly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to
impose the death penalty."); Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 383 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)
("While we might be inclined to rely on time presumption that a trial court is presumed to
have disregarded improper factors in sentencing in non-capital cases, we are reluctant to
do so in capital cases."); People v. Vecchio, 819 P.2d 533, 535 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that "retribution at the polls is a risk undertaken by every judicial candidate upon acceptance in a judicial position"); State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 320 (Idaho 1989) ("The
risk of arbitrary and capricious decisions exists whether the sentence is determined by a
judge or a jury.").
For examples of the extensive scholarship on the effects of such politicization
see, for example, RICHARD C. DIETER, KILLING FOR VOTES: THE DANGERS OF POLITICIZING
THE DEATH PENALTY PROCESS (1996); John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Polities,
Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 CAL. L. REv. 465 (1999); Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate
and Remove Judges for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.C. L. 1W% 308 (1997); Stephen B. Bright
& Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the
Next Election itt Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995).
76 State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 455 (Ariz. 1995) (Feldman, C.J., concnrring).
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because the lower court omits any express reliance on the opinion
testimony in its sentencing order. In People v. Brown," for instance, the
court heard the following opinion testimony (from three different
survivors, including two statements read by the prosecutor): .
People like [the defendant]. . don't deserve to live another
day because they simply don't appreciate life and how precious it is. There seems to be a large injustice that has occurred and something needs to be done about it.
**
It's our prayer that justice prevails and for the defendant,
justice would be that this person who planned and maliciously traumatized and killed our loved ones... be put to
death.... Our family's plea is that you, as judge, give this defendant his just due of death. . . .
**
Judge Gaughan, I am begging you to no longer waste our tax
dollars on a person with no respect for the law or life. I am
begging you to impose the stiffest penalty you can by law on
Anthony Brown.... Society, and especially myself, do not
want people like Brown on this earth. So, please, please,
please give Anthony Brown what he deserves, the death penalty. 78
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the death sentence
ultimately imposed because "[n]otably, the trial judge did not refer to
the [opinion testimony] when he announced his decision to impose
the death penalty."79 Evincing similar faith in the inviolability of its
lower courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a challenge based
on acknowledged sentence opinion testimony, inferring that "the trial
judge remained uninfluenced, since his sentencing decision never
referred to the [witness's] opinion."80
Numerous other decisions highlight the vague definitional parameters of "opinion," with courts adopting decidedly broad under-

"705 N.E.2d 809 (III. 1998).
78 Id. at 822.
79 Id. at 823.
" See Goodwin. 703 N.E.2d at 1262-63; see also, e.g., Hyde v. State, 1998 WL 32605 *7
(Ala, Grim. App. 1998) (rejecting appeal because lower court omitted express reliance on
opinion testimony). NI see Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Ala. 1993) (reversing and rentanding so that trial judge could make express written finding stating
whether opinion testimony was relied upon).
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standings of the term, and erring on the side of permitting testimony.
In Witter v. State for instance, the wife of the decedent read a statement in which she asked the jury to "show no mercy." The Supreme
Court of Nevada unanimously concluded that the witness's comment
did not amount to an "opinion" but rather constituted a request that
the jury return the most severe sentence it felt appropriate.82 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the admissibility of
the following sentiment voiced by the wife of a murdered police
officer:
My family and I are very confident that all of you will return
a quick verdict which will send a message to my children, society, and the law enforcement community that we simply
will not tolerate or accept our last means of protection being
annihilated on our streets. Renew our faith in the criminal
justice system and bring a phase of closure to this ongoing
nightmare that fills our lives."
According to the court, the testimony was permissible because the
requests for "closure" and a "quick verdict" did not relate to the death
penalty, ultimately imposed by the jury, but rather to the witness's
"desire that the jury deliberate in an expedient manner so that she
and her family could move on with their lives." 84 The Supreme Court
of Missouri displayed only slightly less indulgence when it recently
concluded that the following "does not recommend a sentence": "I
believe this man has caused enough chaos and I ask he be fairly punished for what he has done."85
51

921 P.2d 886 (Nev. 1996).

82

See id. at 896.

43

See People v. Williams, 602 N.E.2d 1100, 1124 (111. 1998).

M; see also People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1187-88 (Ill. 1999) (affirming virtually
identical statement of same witness in trial of co-defendant).
55 See State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83, 89 n.2 (Mo. 1999) (en bane). The Eighth Circuit, addressing a federal habeas claim by another Missouri death row inmate, very recently considered the permissibility of a survivor's statement that his flintily "was very concerned" about what would "happen [I" at sentencing. See Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923,
931 (8th Cir. 1999). The court dismissed the statement as "not so outcome specific as the
statements in Booth," and offered the following strained analysis:

The statement could be interpreted to mean that the family wanted the jury
to impose the death sentence, that it did not want the jury to impose the
death sentence, or simply that, no matter what the outcome, the trial was a
very important event for the family.

See id. at 932. Because it granted habeas relief on another basis, however, the court ultimately reserved final judgement on the survivor's statement, adding that lwthether
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Finally, the consequences of uncertainty, and the continued
weakening of Booth, can be observed in what appears as a highly reductionistic, a priori method of judicial gatekeeping. The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals very recently reflected this approach, rejecting a claim when the father and brother of the victim (a police
officer) "begged" the jury to impose death in the name of the victim's
family and "every police officer." 86 According to the Alabama court:
"The jury surely recognized the testimony of the victim impact witnesses as a normal, human reaction to the death of a loved one. That
these witnesses wanted [defendant] to receive the death penalty
would come as no surprise to members of the jury." 87 Similarly, in
Oklahoma sentence opinion testimony is permitted because "a jury
expects such a statement from the victim's family." 88
C. What the Future Likely Holds
Although still frequently acknowledged by the courts, 89 there is
increasing evidence that the putative bar on sentence opinion testimony is weakening, a process that will likely continue in the years to
come. Several reasons account for this. First, the Booth limit on opinion testimony rests on shaky jurisprudential foundations," an instability that should not provide much confidence given the Rehnquist
Court's penchant for reversing or severely limiting what are seen as
liberal criminal justice-related precedents. 91 Indeed, Payne itself represents a compelling example of this predilection, with the six-member
conservative majority led by the Chief Justice showing no compunction whatsoever in reexamining Booth and Gathers." Moreover, the
Court's self-conscious deference to state legislative enactments in the
area of sentencing criteria," and bias in favor of increasing the
dential considerations would counsel against introducing so ambiguous a statement upon
retrial is of course a matter fur the State to consider." See id,
88 See State Whitehead, 1999 WI 669323 *61, *65 (Ala. Grim. App. 1999).
87 Id, at *65.
88 Wood v. State, 959 P.2d 1,12 (Okla. CI'l111, App, 1998).
89 See, e.g., St:ttev. Sienson, 940 P.2d 1239,1279 n.19 (Wash. 1997) (stating lilt is clear
neither the defendant's family nor the victim's family may tell the jury what sentence
sho u ld be imposed").
99 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
91 See generally CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISI IMENT (1997); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Deciiis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era
to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VANn. L. REV. 647 (1999).
92 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25 (asserting "Mite States remain free, in capital
cases, as well as others, to devise new procedures and new remedies to meet felt needs");
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amount of information put before capital juries," as evidenced by
Payne,95 make the continued viability of the remnants of Booth all the
more uncertain. Indeed, in the Payne oral argument, both then-U.S.
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (making an unusual personal
appearance) and counsel for the State of Tennessee argued that sentence opinion testimony should be permitted for the prosecution and
defense alike in capital proceedings. 96
Second, attention doubtless will increasingly be drawn to the current jurisprudential asymmetry, which allows sentence opinion testiid. at 824 (stating that luhuler our constitutional system, the primary responsibility Ibr
defining crimes against state law, fixing punishments for the commission of these crimes,
and establishing procedures fOrcriminal trials rests with the States"); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) (asserting "the States enjoy their traditional latitude to
prescribe the method by which those who commit murder shall be punished"); Booth, 482
U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (arguing "determinations of appropriate sentencing considerations are 'peculiarly questions of legislative policy'"); see also
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating because
the "Court has no special expertise in deciding" sentencing criteria, "lilt makes little sense
to substitute our judgment of relevance for that of state courts and legislatures");
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (stating the Court will "presume f the] validity"
of a criminal enactment and that "a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the
judgment of the representatives of the people").
94 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204 (stating "fw]e think it desirable for the jury to have as
much information before it as possible when it snakes the sentencing decision").
55 As Chiefjustice Rehnquist stated for the Court:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to
assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it
should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm
caused by the defendant. "The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting
the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss
to society and in particular to his fluidly."

Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (Thite, J., dissenting)). But see id. at
859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to majority's approval of victim impact evidence as a
"classic non sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance.").
To a significant extent, this inclusiveness stems from the Court's apparent frustration over trying to reconcile the competing demands of accuracy and uniformity in
capital procedures. As Professor Markus Dubber has stated, "[t] he current disarray in capital jurisprudence accurately reflects the uneasy compromise that must plague any system
designed to accommodate our compassion for the victims of capital crimes while preserving the dignity of those whose lives it puts at stake." Dubber, supra note 3, at 155. According to Dubber, "fclapital sentencing law is in a state of acute system overload... symbolizling] a system that has thrown its hands up in frustration with its inability to
accommodate all relevant interests within a framework of meaningful rules." Id.
96 See LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 65, at 822-23 (counsel for State
of Tennessee); see also id. at 833 (Attorney General Thornburgh).
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molly to be considered in non-capital, yet not in capital, trials. 97 With
the Supreme Court in the lead, the "death is different" rationale—
invoked by the Booth majority to bar victim impact evidence in capital
trials alone—is showing obvious signs of wear.98 For evidence of the
allure of such emerging symmetry one need only look once again to
Payne, which unequivocally renounced Booth's asymmetric, per se prohibition of victim impact evidence solely in capital trials. As Justice
White noted in his Booth dissent, a rationale ultimately triumphant in
the Payne majority opinion:
If punishment_ can he enhanced in noncapital cases on the
basis of the harm caused, irrespective of the offender's
specific intention to cause such harm, I fail to see why the
same approach is unconstitutional in death cases. If anything
I would think that victim impact statements are particularly
appropriate in capital sentencing hearings: the State has a
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence
which the defendant is entitled to put in . . .
. 99

Third, and perhaps most important, the admission of sentence
opinion testimony lies with the grain of larger systemic changes now
occurring nationwide as a result of the powerful victims' rights
movement. 100 Today, the constitutions of at least thirty-one states con97 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing widespread availability of victims' right to opine on sentences); see also Tobolmsky, supra note 6, at 69 (stating "a victim's right to be heard at sentencing has been one of the most widely adopted victim rights
in the last fifteen years. The federal system and every state provide eligible victims an opportintity to oiler input to the court regarding sentencing either in writing, orally or

both. ").
98 See, e.g., Deborah W. Demi°, Gelling to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L.
REv. 319, 323 (1997) (noting 1 in lore recently, the Court has twisted the purpose of death
is different to such an extent that the doctrine now represents the ultimate irony. Death
often triggers fewer safeguards in certain circumstances than lesser forms of punish-

ment."); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Dec-

ades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 397 (1995)
(slating "close examination of the Court's decisions over the past twenty years reveals t ha t
the procedural safeguards in death cases are not as different as one might expect. Although the Court has carved out a series of protections applicable only to capital trials, it
has done so in an entirely ad hoc Fashion and ... relegate[d] capital defendants to the
same level of protection as non-capital defendants.").
99 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting).
lc* The opinions of several members of the Court iu Payne highlight the inescapable
influence of the movement. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that Booth "conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice
in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement."); id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that the majority "obviously has been moved by an argument that has strong political ap-
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tain victims' rights provisionsP and efforts have been made in the
last several sessions of Congress to adopt a Victims' Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 102 Among the many rights sought to be
peal but no proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion"); id. at 867 (acknowledging "the
political strength of the 'victims' rights' movement" and "recognizlingl that today's decision will he greeted with enthusiasm by a large number of concerned and thoughtful citizens").
Among the many telling indicia of this pervasive influence is the result reached
in People e Robinson, 699 N.E.2d 1086 (III. CI . App. 1998), vacated, 719 N.E.2d 662 (III.
1999). Robinson involved the joint appeal of live defendants, each of whom died during the
pendency of their appeals, and raised the question of whether the defendants' intervening
deaths served to abate their convictions ab initio. Id. at 1089. hue court stressed that although historically criminal prosecutions were designed to "punish the guilty and protect
society front any future criminal misdeeds of the defendant," the rights of "crime victims
and witnesses" today also "have important, personal interests at stake in criminal prosecutions." Id. The latter possess legally recognized rights in criminal proceedings which are
distinct from the interests of either the defendant or the State." Id. Taking into account
the gripping victim impact testimony adduced in the voluntary manslaughter trial of one
appellant, which included a survivor's request that the court impose a sentence so as to
I Wel]) renew our faith in the judicial system and help us to cope with our loss," the court
rejected the claim of each appellant convicted of a "violent crime." Id. at 1090.
In these cases, individual victims suffered horrible physical and psychological injury, and their families endured almost unspeakable emotional anguish. Both the [Victim-Witness Rights] Act and our constitution now recognize that the families of these victims ... continue to stiffer, long after the
horror of the criminal attack ....
Clearly, a judicial order vacating the conviction of . • . a defendant who is
no longer able to appreciate the benefits of such a ruling, would have a senselessly harsh impact upon the psychological well being of [survivors]. It would
further have the effect of eroding confidence in the criminal justice system
among those victims and witnesses who participated in the trial by subjecting
the trial result ... to the arbitrary timing [of defendant's death].
Id. at 1089. But see id. at 1093 (Greiman, J., dissenting) (stating lglenerally, courts have
taken the position that the aim of the criminal justice system is the protection of the public
and the punishment of the guilty. Upon the death of a defendant, these goals are unnecessary on the one hand and impossible on the other.").
101 See Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 289 (1999). An example of such a provision is found in the
Missouri Constitution, which ensures crime victims the right to be "'ward at guilty pleas,
bail hearings, seutencings ... unless in the determination of the court the interests of
justice require otherwise." See Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32.1(2). Interpreting this provision, the
Supreme Court of Missouri recently addressed whether a lower court. acted unreasonably
when it rejected a request front the victim's survivors that life be imposed on the defendant. See State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1998) (en bane). The Barnett court
affirmed, concluding that "the requirements of this provision are fully satisfied by affording victims the opportunity for input at sentencing, and in this case, that opportunity was
provided." Id. at 308; see also State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 179 (Mo. 1998) (holding same
on virtually identical facts).
102 See generally Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gate? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims'
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (1999); Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion:
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enshrined in the proposed federal amendment is a right provided to
the victim or the "victim's lawful representative"' to "be heard
and/or submit a statement regarding sentencing," 1" Needless to say,
the prospect of affording the survivors of murder victims a constitutional right to express their views Ott the appropriate sentence to be
imposed on the killers of their loved ones would doubtless have substantial appeal to victims' advocatesm and politicians alike. 106 Proponents would also likely assert that such direct involvement in sentencing would have the salutary effect of promoting citizen reliance on,
and belief in, the justice system, an interest repeatedly identified by
the Supreme Court in its capital decisions"'
The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10 ST. TuomAs L. REv. 579 (1998) [hereinafter Coopting Compassion]; Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, Essay, With Disdain for the.
Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victim's I?ights Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REv. 371 (2000).
1"
1"

See Sj. Res. 44, 105th Cong., § 1 (1998).
Id. § 2.

155 As noted by one commentator over ten years ago: "Victim opinion is probably the
type of victim information that proponents of victim participation at sentencing want most
to be allowed in sentencing proceedings." Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of
Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 210 (1988).
The personal benefit ultimately accruing to those providing testimony, however,
is open to question. Compare Susan E. Cergan & Nicholas Rodriguez, Victims' Roles in the
Criminal lustier System: A Fallacy of Victim Empowerment?, 8 Sr. JOHN'S J. LEGAL. COMMENT.
255 (1992) (discussing "positive catharsis" among survivors of providing testimony) with
Berger, supra note 67, at 59 (slating survivor testimony "encourages the prosecution to
urge mourning Inntily and friends to present their grief in a forum ill-suited to respond to
it, yet holding out a seductive (if illusory) capacity to do so"). See generally Lynne
Henderson, Revisiting Victims' Rights, 1999 UTAH I.. REv. 383, 402-11 (1999) (surveying
arguments made in support of the "therapeutic rationale").
106 See, e.g., Jou, BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE 'W{ ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND
NEW Victims 119-41 (1999) (describing powerful empathic appeal of "the victim industry"); Henderson. supra note 102, at 591 (stating that Individual victims and victims'
groups supporting punitive responses to crime have the public and legislative ear; those
that du not are ignored"); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411,
1414 (1993) (stating that "Wile stories of victims are attractive because they arouse emotions"); Bruce Shapiro,

Victims & Wngeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment is a Bad Idea,

THE NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11 (stating "kin the language of American politics today,

victims of violent crime are accorded uniquely sanctified status"); Jeffery Toobin,

Power.' How a New Ergo! Movement is Shaping the Oklahoma City Bombing Trial,

Victim.

THE NEW

YORKER, Mar. 24, 1997, at 40 (discussing influence of victims' rights movement and its im-

pact. on new federal legislation evolving out of the Timothy McVeigh capital trial). As Professor Henderson has observed: lalpparently, no matter what the substance of a victim's
rights proposal is, anyone who objects is considered to be 'against' victims. It is dillicult to
point out the harms that proposals could cause victims as well as the criminal process when
one is so categorized." Henderson, Co-opting Compassion, supra note 102, at 580 n.11.
107 See, e.g., Gun: 428 U.S. at 183 (asserting death penalty is "essential in an ordered
society that asks its citizens to rely on legal process rather than self-help to vindicate their
wrongs"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting
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In short, there is ample reason to expect that sentence opinion
testimony will continue to proliferate in capital trials," 8 increasing the
likelihood that the Supreme Court will be obliged to re-examine the
appropriateness of such testimony. With this prospect in mind, the
Article next surveys the several compelling reasons why the move toward allowing sentence opinion testimony in capital trials should be
vigorously resisted.
II. WHY SENTENCE OPINION TESTIMONY SHOULD BE BARRED

Because the death penalty is society's most severe punishthent,
capital sentencing procedures are theoretically designed to single out
only the most death-worthy."9 In order to facilitate this sorting, death
penalty jurisdictions employ a bifurcated procedure. After first determining that a particular defendant is guilty of an enumerated capital crime, the sentencing authority (typically a jury) must decide
whether death should be imposed."° In so doing, a "reasoned moral
response" to the crime and the defendant is reached,'" which turns
on aggravating and mitigating circumstances deemed relevant and
worthy of consideration.'"
Given that the sentencing phase is the denouement of a capital
trial, it should come as no surprise that in many cases the friends and

that society permits individuals to channel their instinctive need to exact retribution when
it makes death available as a sentencing option).
108 See, e.g., FLETCIIER, supra note 1, at 198 ("One of the curiosities of the American victims' rights movement is lieu it balks at strong measures to empower the victim at the pretrial and trial phases and then abandons all restraint on the victim's input at the time of
sentencing. If the jury 1111(15 the defendant guilty, then the victim comes into his own.");
Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 986 (1985) (noting
"the most politically visible activity in the victim's rights movement focuses on the end,
rather than the beginning of the criminal process").
109 See Calilbrilia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (stating "Wile qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination").
110 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971 (1994) (stating "[o]ur capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital
decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision"); Lowenfeld v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (stating similarly).
Ill See Pony v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 /1.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 900 (1983)) (referring to decision as a "highly subjective, 'unique, individualized
judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves'").
112 See generallyjeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandalay Capital Punishment Schemes, 6 Wm. & MARY BILL OF Rrs. J.
343 (1998).
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loved ones of the victim and the defendant wish to have a direct say.
However, precisely because the penalty phase is so critical and delicate, a time when the sentencer must make the visceral, moral choice
of whether the offender deserves death,'" sentence opinion testimony should be barred.
A. The Constitutional Irrelevance of Witness Sentence Opinion Testimony
The first, and most fundamental, reason in support of the prohibition of sentence opinion testimony is its distinct irrelevance to capital decision making. A witness's opinion—even when the witness is a
loved one of the murder victim—that a defendant deserves death in
no way serves to aggravate a murder to death-worthiness. An opinion
does not relate to the nature of the offense or the offender, the cornerstones of death penalty decision making." 4 Nor, for that matter,
does a witness's expressly stated opinion that a punishment less than
death is warranted come within the ambit of mitigation as conceived
by the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, because it does
not relate to "any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense."" 5
As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in State v. Hu ertas, such opinions "have nothing to do with culpability or moral guilt. They are
simply opinions on the appropriate sentence given by someone who,
though having a great personal interest in the outcome, is not a
member of the jury." 116 Despite the fact that evidentiary rules are relaxed in the capital sentencing phase," 7 admissibility still turns on
The Supreme Court has been at pains to acknowledge the uniquely burdensome
(ask Faced by capital juries:
A capital sentencing jury is m a de up of imiiVidtials placed in a very unfatitiliar
situation mut called upon to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice.
They are confronted with evidence and argument on the issue of whether
another should die, and they are asked to decide the issue on behalf of the
community. Moreover, they are given only partial guidance as to how their
judgment should be exercised, leaving them whit substantial discretion.
Calthvell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985).
"4 See En mud v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (stating the appropriateness of a
death sentence "Very much depends on the degree of [defendant's] culpability").
" 5 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443
(1990) ("[11t is precisely because the punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect
to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense.").
116 See553 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (Ohio 1990).
117 See United States v. Frank, 8 F. Stipp. 2d 253, '269 (S.O.N.Y. 1998) (observing
hat
the federal rules of evidence are suspended during a capital sentencing hearing is particti-

540

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 41:517

"relevance," as circumscribed by the constitutional parameters of aggravation and mitigation. 118 Opinion testimony simply strays beyond
those considerations deemed necessary to reach a constitutionally
valid, "reasoned moral response."" 8 Ultimately, if either death proponents or opponents were allowed to so testify, death deliberations
would be reduced to a "contest of irrelevant opinions." 120
B. The Specter of Arbitrariness

A related but distinct reason to bar sentence opinion testimony is
its arbitrary quality. Since Furman v. Georgia, 121 the Supreme Court has
guarded against the introduction of factors that might contribute to
arbitrary decision making in capital cases. Ostensibly at least, the
lady appropriate given the difference of death front all other penalties"). See generally Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical
and Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 411
(1992) (discussing relaxation of otherwise strict evidentiary rules in the capital penalty
phase).
115 Moreover, even if evidentiary rules applied with full force, opinion testimony would
be inadmissible. See, e.g., FED. R. Evio. 701 (permitting lay witness opinion testimony only
if "rationally based on the perception of the witness ..."). Clearly, a witness's opinion on
punishment is not "rationally based," but rather constitutes a highly personal, subjective
assessment.
" 9 See supa notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
12° Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991), aff'g 829 F.2d 1501, 1504 (10th
Cir. 1987) (affirming upon reconsideration in wake of Payne). With respect to victims,
opinions can originate from victims themselves (on the basis of a pre-murder expression of
preference) or, more commonly, their survivors. For examples of courts rejecting admission of testimony of murder victims' anti-death views at sentencing, see Campbell v. State,
679 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1996) (upholding preclusion of testimony that the murder victim
opposed capital punishment because testimony did not constitute mitigating evidence
because it related to neither the defendant nor his crime) and Stale v. Barone, 969 P.2d
1013, 1031-32 (On 199$) (concluding same). For examples of survivors' anti-deatli semimews being rejected, see Robison, 943 F.2d at 1217-18 and State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869,
887 (Ariz. 1997).
In an interesting twist, a recent Arizona case involved survivors with conflicting
views on the appropriateness of the death penalty for the defendant. The victim's sister
submitted a statement to the sentencing court requesting life imprisonment, not death,
because "she did not want defendant's family to suffer the way her family had suffered."
State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 454 (Ariz. 1995). The Arizona Supreme Court summarily
deemed the request irrelevant as mitigating evidence as it did not relate to defendant's
character or the circumstances of the offense. See id. Also in the same case, the presentence report provided to the sentencing court indicated that the victim's father and another sister wished that death be imposed. See id. This latter information the tl'illianis court
deemed irrelevant, yet harmless because there was no evidence that the judge "gave any
weight to the victims' recommendations when he sentenced defendant on the capital
cumuli." Id. at 455.
121 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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death decision must be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. "122
Sentence opinion testimony is decidedly at odds with this mandate, as it enhances the risk that death will be "imposed out of whim,
passion, prejudice or mistake." 123 As stated by the Booth Court, "formal
presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on
the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. "124
Admission of "emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions
the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the
reasoned decision making we require in capital cases." 125
Opinion testimony, in short, allows the sentencer to impose (or
abstain from) death not because the evidence warrants such an outcome, but because of the unpredictable desires of witnesses. 126 In addition, relative to factual testimony otherwise put before the sentencer, the highly subjective (and typically emotional) quality of
opinion testimony heightens the risk of the sentencing decision being
influenced by the entirely arbitrary fortuity of the persuasiveness, attractiveness or eloquence of witnesses. 127 While of course such form122 Greggv.
gg Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); see also Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 (prohibiting consideration of factors that arc "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to
the sentencing process"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (identifying constitutional need for "reliability , in the determination that death is the appropriate

punishment in a specific case").
123 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connord., concurring); see also
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (citation omitted) (stating that capital procedures should seek to ensure that the "death penalty is ... imposed on the basis of 'reason rather than caprice or emotion").
124 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987).
125 Id. at 508-09.
' 26 See, e.g., Victoria Harker, Cry for Mercy; Church Aide Killers Sentenced Today,'FHE ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 1999, at Al (descrilOg conflicting desires of survivors of
victim murder over whether death penaltj, should he imposed); Reynolds Holding, Some
Victims More Equal Mon Othen, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 6, 2000. at 3 (describing sentencing proceeding wherein victim's mother testified of a "revelation" that her son wanted
life imposed, to which the jury deferred).
127 Payne, of course, is subject to a similar charge of arbitrariness, insofar as the amount
and quality of impact evidence available to the State inevitably turns on the vagaries of the
particular victim involved, and the eloquence and appeal of the State's witnesses willing to
testify. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860-64 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
same). The Payne majority's primary rationale, however—that. "impact" should weigh in
the sentencer's evaluation of die "harm" caused by the murder, even if the specific loss was
not contemplated by the defendant—enjoys at least some plausible merit, however attenuated. Opinion testimony, on the other hand, benefits from nothing of the sort, as it has no
bearing on culpability whatsoever. But see ,generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of the Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal 1aw, 122 U. PA. L.
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ities are basic to the adversary system, 128 this does not justify the purposeful injection of arbitrariness on the "ultimate issue" into the delicate capital decision making process.I 29 This is especially so given the
increasing evidence that capital jurors commonly decide the life or
death question prematurely during the guilt phase, 13° and that jurors
are otherwise emotionally and logically predisposed to accord
significant weight to the punitive views of survivors, in particular, 01
REV. 1497 (1974) (arguing that overemphasis on resulting harm disserves other important
goals and concerns of criminal law).
128 justice White's dissent in Booth downplayed this concern:
The Court's reliance on the alleged arbitrariness that can result from the differing ability of victims' families to articulate their sense of loss is a
makeweight consideration: No two prosecutors have exactly the same ability
to communicate to the jury; no two witnesses have exactly the same ability to
communicate the facts; but there is no requirement in capital cases that the
evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest common denominator.

Booth, 482 U.S. at 517-18 (Whited., dissenting). A substantial body of empirical work on
the influence of witness traits on juror deliberations, however, undercuts this judicial insouciance. See, e.g., Narina Nunez et al., The Testimony of Elderly Victim/Witnesses and Their

Impact on Juror Witnesses: The Importance of Examining Multiple Stereotypes, 23 LAW & Hum.
BERM'. 413 (1999).
129 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1148 (1994) (order denying certiorari)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Furman demanded that the sentencer's discretion be directed
and limited by procedural rules and objective standards in order to minimize the risk of
arbitrary and capricious sentences of death."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (stating that capital
procedures must seek to "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action").
1 " See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing. Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Thal Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476, 14871503 (1998). Professor Bowers and his colleagues found that 48.3% of the 864 capital
jurors surveyed, drawn from seven states, had predetermined life or death by the conclusion of the guild stage, with 28.6% electing death and 19.7% life (51.7% were undecided).
Id. at 1488 & tb1.1. Moreover, most jurors who took early stands persisted in their views to
the final sentencing determination. M. at 1491-94; see also Marla Sandys, cross-ovea—capitatfurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines,

70 INn. L.J. 1183, 1220 (1995) (stating "the data reveal quite dratnatically that ... the majority of jurors reach their decisions about guilt and punishment at the same time").
131 Pro-death witnesses for the State, especially the victim's survivors, benefit not just
front the imprimatur of the State, but also from the natural empathic fealty jurors have for
the victim, as opposed to the defendant they just found guilty of murder. See generally
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 203 (staling "[a] primary function of punishment ... is to express solidarity with the victim"); see also Markus D. Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Auton-.
way and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 114, 144 (1998) (noting
"ftloday, the gap between judge and judged ... runs wide and deep .... Empathic
identification is limited to victims and considered beyond the pale for violent offenders.");
Craig Haney, Violence and the CapitalJury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse
to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1469 (1997) (observing "most capital juries will
be terribly frightened by defendants, and provoked to punitive and vengeful feelings, long
before they are exposed to any other information about them"); James Luginbithl & Michael Burkbead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Engouraging Votes for Death, 20 Am.
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Exacerbating this situation further still is the widespread tendency of
capital jurors to disavow the onus of responsibility with regard to
death decisions. 132 For jurors so inclined, deference to the emotional
plea of a witness would likely have significant attraction.
Moreover, even presuming that sentence opinion testimony enjoyed constitutional merit, it should be barred because of its highly
questionable probative value. Iii Payne, for instance, not even the
Tennessee prosecutor could have seriously contended that he could
divine with certainty the type of punishment young Nicholas (then
four years old) would recommend when mature enough to entertain
such an opinion. What if Nicholas grew up to be a staunch opponent
of the death penalty, yet Pervis Payne was condemned to death and
executed in the intervening years? Would "justice" have be served under such circumstances?" 3 Simply put, the stakes are too high in
death penalty cases for outcomes to be driven by the unpredictable
and highly inflammatory desires of witnesses' opinions on the key issue before the sentencer." 4
J. CHM. Jusr. 1, 5-6 (1995) (slating "there is clearly no direct way for a jury to help the
victim or the victim's family. An indirect way, however, is to punish the defendant").
132 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 44 BUFF.
L REV. 339 (1996); Joseph H. Hoffman, Metes The Buch?Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penally Cases, 70 IND. LJ. 1137 (1995); Steven J. Sherman, The Capital
jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. LJ. 1183
(1995).

tss As Professor George Fletcher has written: "Why, after all, should young Nicholas
grow up and feel that if Payne merely received a long prison sentence justice was not
done?" See FLETcHER, supra note 1, at 200. indeed, numerous sttulies highlight that crime
victims are not as harshly punitive as otherwise reflexively presumed. See, e.g., Edna Erez,
Victim Participation in Sentencing: !Meiotic and Reality, 18 J. CRIM. Just. 19, 25 (1990) (citing
studies); Tobolowsky, supra note 6, at 84-85 (1998) (same).
134 Elsewhere, I have argued that such sentiments should be acceded to, but under distinctly different circumstances: only at the charging stage and when the victim has executed a "declaration of life," a notarized &cannon' requesting that, should the signer be
murdered, that the State exercise mercy in its threshold decision whether to seek the
death penalty. See Wayne A. Logan, Declining Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims' Anti-Death
Penalty Views and Prosecutots' Charging Decisions, 18 CIUM. JUST. Emtes 41 (Fall 1999). 1
argue that the moral, social, and legal value Ainerican society attaches to autonomous
decision making. at least with respect to the exercise of mercy by the State, compels that
the murder victim's expressly memorialized wishes be deferred to at the charging stage. See
id. at 48-49.
At the charging stage, the prosecutor makes a threshold determination on is
case-by-case basis of whether to submit d le death decision to the sentencing authority—the
"conscience of the community"—and enjoys virtually unlimited discretion in whether
death should be pursued. See, e.g„ Simpson v. Slate, 6 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Ark. 1999) (utilizing "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review in challenge to prosecutor's capital
charging discretion). See also generally Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and
Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORD1tAm URn. LJ. 347, 440-45 (1999)
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C. Usurpation of the Sentencing Authority's Role
A final concern stems front the reality that opinion testimony not
merely distracts the sentencing authority from its constitutional duty
to weigh only relevant factors, but actually usurps its fundamental
mission. It is the job of the sentencer—whether judge or jury—to
express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death." 135 In Mcaesky v. Kemp, the Court characterized this
function as follows:
"

The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant .... Mt is the
jury's function to make the difficult and uniquely human
judgments that defy codification and buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system. 138
Sentence opinion testimony usurps this critical responsibility, insofar
as it urges the sentencer to defer to the personal views of individual
witnesses, at the expense of constitutionally recognized aggravating
and mitigating evidence. 137 As the Tenth Circuit has noted: "Because
the offense was committed against the community as a whole ... only
the community, speaking through the jury, has the right to determine
what punishment should be administered." 38 In Huertas, the Ohio
Supreme Court expressed this identical concern, stating that opinion
(discussing broad discretionary power of federal prosecutors in capital charging decisions). At the sentencing juncture, however, a different constellation of goals is at play. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (distinguishing differing goals of charging versus sentencing decisions). Indeed, this difference is reflected in separation of powers analysis, with the judiciary possessing significant oversight powers in the post-charge, but not pre-charge, realm.
Seefames M. Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARI:. L. REV. 1521, 153743 (1981) (discussing same). More importantly, it is at sentencing that the inherently
difficult, ultimate decision must be made, a decision most often carried out by jurors
highly susceptible to the emotion-laden opinions of others. For reasons discussed here, the
admission of irrelevant, highly arbitrary opinion testimony has no place in the intensely
individualized decision that intim be made in this context.
135 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (stating that imposition of the death penalty "is au expression of the comm u nity's belief that
certain crimes are so grievous ... that the only adequate response may he the death penalty"). See generally Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Micti. L. REV. 2381,
2420-27 (1999) (examining origin and purpose of "conscience of community" command).
156 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987).
137 See United States v. Ness, 665 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting the danger that
"the jury could easily accord too much weight to the pronouncement of a lay witness ...
whose statement could be charged with ... emotionalism").
138 Robison, 829 F.2d at 1505.
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testimony "in a capital case violate [s] the defendant's constitutional
right to have the sentencing decision made by the judge or the
jury." 39 In effect, as Huertas concluded, witness opinions impermissibly and inexorably "go to the ultimate issue" before a jury, usurping
the sentencing authority's function in a capital trial.R°
D. A Response to the Cynics
The prohibition advocated here is potentially vulnerable to at
least two arguments. The first is one already evidenced in judicial rationales, namely: What is the point of barring opinion testimony,
when the views of witnesses (whether for the prosecution or defense)
likely can be readily surmised by the sentencer?" 1 While perhaps realistic, this recognition does not justify admission of sentence opinion
testimony. Indeed, there is the converse inference: Why is such testimony warranted if it can be forecasted? To permit it under such circumstances smacks of excessiveness and arbitrariness, the very threats
guard against since Furman and
that the Court has endeavored
the testimony typically comes from a
Gregg."2 Furthermore, because the
distraught witness, it is all the more problematic, serving to take the
death decision making process even further beyond the intended
realm of a "reasoned moral response" to the defendant and the crime
of conviction.
A second argument derives from the confounding procedural
dynamic of modern capital trials themselves: How can sentence opinion testimony be meaningfully distinguished from other, already permitted forms of testimony that bear striking resemblance to it? For
instance, with respect to the defense, courts regularly allow "pleas for
mercy" by defense witnesses. 143 Allocution, when the capital defen139
140

See 553 N.E.2d at 1060.
See id. at 1064; see also Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)

(stating "Lcfluestions that would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to
reach are not permitted").
141 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
142 See Gregg, 428 U.S. al 189 (stating capital procedures should endeavor to "minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action").
143 See, e.g., State v. Hines, 938 i'.2d 388, 406 (Cal. 1997) (noting aunt "expressed her
love for defendant, and asked the jury not to sentence him to death"); State V. Barnes, 496
S.E.2d 674, 688 (Ga. 1998) (deeming it "reversible error to prevent a friend or relative of
the defendant from taking the stand and pleading with the jury for mercy"); Cofield v.
State, 274 S.E.2d 530, 542 (Ga. 1981) (stating "[w le are unwilling to foreclose a defendant
seeking to avoid the imposition of the death penalty from appealing to the mercy of the
jury by having his parents testily briefly to their love for him. The state frequently uses
members of the victim's family for no different purpose."); State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d
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dant himself addresses the sentencing authority on the question of
death, inevitably bears close similarity as wel1. 144 Prosecutors, for their
part, are permitted to express their personal view that death is war-

ranted, so long as the "opinion is based on the evidence adduced at
trial." n45 Finally, what is the point of barring sentence opinion testimony when Payne already has opened the emotional floodgates with
respect to survivor testimony?
Plainly, to distinguish sentence opinion testimony from the tangled mass of kindred testimony now otherwise allowed in capital trials
presents a significant line-drawing challenge. In the end, the only
identifiable distinction might well turn on the quality of the testimony
insofar as it comes in the form of an express recommendation for the
sentencer to follow, as opposed to an allowable inference. However
difficult, distinctions can and must be made in this extremely subtle
yet high-stakes decisional enterprise. 146 Indeed, the emotionalism
165, 189 (Mo. 1997) (en Banc) (noting "mother's plea for mercy" as mitigation strategy);
State v. 1DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 771 (Nj. 1994) (upholding trial court's decision to permit
mother of defendant, but not his siblings, to plead for mercy and adding that it "may not
agree" with preclusion of the siblings' testimony); State v. Woodward, 623 N.E.2d 75, 82
(Ohio 199'3) (noting defendant's mother and sister testified that "they love appellant, and
both requested that he be spared the death penally," but assigning testimony "little or no
weight in mitigation"); see also James R. Acker & Charles Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital Punishment Laws, 30 CRIK LAW anti.. 299, 308-09 (1994)
(noting "even the most unforgiving statutes inevitably are tempered by mercy in application .... Even if it were possible to exclude mercy from capital punishment hearings statutorily, it would be imprudent to do so.").
144 See, e.g., Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 604 (Nev. 1992) (holding "capital defendants in the State of Nevada enjoy the common law right of allocution [ before the jury] ");
DiFrisco, 645 A.2d at 757 (stating "the purpose of allocution is Iwo-fold. First, it reflects our
commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity
to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings
of remorse."); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 216 (Wash. 1991) (upholding right of defendant
to make unsworn plea for mercy to jury); see also J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's

Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation,
15 N.M. L. Rev. 41 (1985); Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing:
A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. Rev. 787 (1997).
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has justified the admission of victim impact evidence itself in part because of the availability of allocution to capital defendants.
SeeState v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 182 (N.J. 1996).
145 See People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 255 (Cal. 1998). But see MODE1. Cone or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106(c) (4) (stating "a lawyer shall not . . . assert his professional opinion as to the justness of a cause").
146 See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, 966 P.24 442, 505-06 (Cal. 1998) (distinguishing testimony from defendant's family on the toll an execution would have, permissible as "indimeet" evidence of defendant's background and character, from basis to garner sympathy for
family, the latter animproper mitigator); Childs v. Slate, 357 S.E.2d 48, 60 (Ga. 1987) (distinguishing defense witnesses' pleas fur mercy from sen tence opinion testimony insofar as
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sanctioned by Payne in particular makes it all the more crucial that the
law be vigilant in its effort to preserve what remains of the "reasoned
moral response" once thought intrinsic to death decision making.
CONCLUSION

For reasons largely attributable to the success of the victims'
rights movement, the justice system—and death penalty litigation in
particular—have become increasingly personalized. 147 This Article has
focused on one particular aspect of this evolution, that of witnesses in
capital sentencing proceedings offering their opinions on whether
convicted murderers should be put to death. For the reasons discussed, so long as capital prosecutions continue to proliferate in
number across the nation, sentence opinion testimony will continue
to make its way into the death decision making process. In the face of
this inevitability, this Article has advanced several compelling reasons
why, once and for all, the Supreme Court should impose an unequivocal, bright-line rule prohibiting opinion testimony in capital sentencing proceedings, a forum that can ill afford the additional arbitrariness that the testimony indisputably threatens.

former embodies a wish and the latter an opinion on the result the jttry "ought" to reach,
effectively usurping the jury's function): State v. Johnson, 525 S.E.2d 519, 525 (S.C. WOO)
(same).
197 Consistent with this evolution, academic commentators of late have urged that
there occur a fundamental re-thinking of the traditional theoretical models used to conceptualize the criminal process. Scr„ e.g., Beloof, supra note 101, at 326-27 (arguing for a
"third model," the "Victim Participation Model," to compliment Professor Packer's traditional "Crime Control" and "Due Process" models); Tatjana Hornle, Distribution of Punishment: The Role of a Victint's Perspective, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. Rev. 175 (1999) (arguing for an "objective victim's perspective" ill sentencing); William T. Pizzi, Victims' Rights: Rethinking Our
Adversary System, 1999 LJTAn L. Rev. 349 (arguing for a "multi-sided" approach to criminal
process).

